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DENNIS D. MURAOKA* and WALTER J. MEAD**
Diligence Requirements in Federal
Natural Resource Sale and Leasing
INTRODUCTION
The federal government owns 726.7 million acres or about thirty-two
percent of the land in the United States.' It also controls vast offshore
acreage.' These land holdings place large quantities of natural resources
under federal stewardship. Federal lands have produced substantial amounts
of major energy resources including crude oil, natural gas, coal and
geothermal steam. Federal energy leases produced oil shale, tar sands,
gilsonite (asphalt), and uranium. Other nonenergy minerals, including
phosphate, sodium, potassium (potash), sulphur, and lead have been
mined commercially on federal lands. In addition, federal lands also
contain other hardrock minerals3 and mineral materials in commercial
quantities.4 Large quantities of wood and wood products are also taken
from federal lands. Rather than develop resources itself, the federal gov-
ernment has instead opted to transfer exploration and development rights
to the private sector. Broad guidelines for selling or leasing of these
resources from federal lands have been specified by Congress. As the
trustee for these important national assets, the government has an obli-
gation to manage efficiently. Failure to do so wastes resources and lowers
living standards.
Private lessees of federal lands have long been encouraged through the
force of federal law and policy to explore and develop leases "diligently."
However, nowhere in federal law is diligence defined. Generally, diligent
production has come to mean sooner rather than later production of a
resource. On mineral leases, where exploratory activities may be nec-
essary, diligent exploration appears to require exploration without delay.
If reserves are discovered in commercial quantities, a decision by a lessee
*Associate Professor, Department of Economics, California State University, Long Beach.
**Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara.
I. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, 171 Public Land Statistics
1986, at 5 (Mar. 1987).
2. Offshore lands extending outward from adjacent state jurisdiction (usually three miles) to "the
limit of operability" are under U.S. government control. This area is known as the Outer Continental
Shelf.
3. Uranium and lead are hardrock minerals. Other hardrock minerals include, but are not limited
to, copper, zinc, magnesium, nickel, tungsten, gold, silver, bentonite, barite, feldspar and fluorspar.
4. Mineral materials include, but are not limited to, sand, gravel, clay, top soil and stone.
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to withhold production would be described as "nondiligent development."
But these definitions ignore the fundamental question of whether society
is made better off if leaseholders are pressed to produce these resources
for current consumption rather than save them for future consumption.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL SALE AND LEASING
PROCEDURES
Before answering this fundamental question, it is necessary to identify
the basic economic goals of natural resource management. Economists
widely agree that the goal of natural resource management policy is to
maximize the present value of the economic rent derivable from re-
sources.' Economic rent is the payment to a factor of production, like
public lands, above that necessary to keep the factor in a particular use.
From the perspective of welfare economics, the economic rent of federal
lands is the difference between the discounted social value of the revenues
generated from the land, and the discounted social costs incurred in
generating this revenue. All costs and revenues are stated in present values
because they occur at different points in time. Social costs include all
necessary costs of production. They are the payments for labor, capital,
energy and all other inputs economically necessary to develop the land.
They also include the value of damage to the environment due to devel-
opment. They do not include payments to the government for the right
to develop federal lands. These payments are not economic costs, but are
transfer payments from the private to the public sector. Economists rec-
ommend the development of any resource having a positive net present
value. The optimal timing of exploration and development is determined
by maximizing the present value of the resource. The maximization of
economic rent is the economic meaning of resource conservation.
Natural resource sale and leasing procedures affect the economic rent
that can be derived from a resource. Those procedures which lead to
excessive costs, reduced revenues, or the suboptimal timing of devel-
opment, reduce economic rent and are to be avoided. Thus, a policy that
forces early production, when later production would increase the present
value of the resource, reduces the economic rent that accrues to the
government and the American people for which it is the trustee.
Economic theory does not always favor sooner rather than later de-
velopment of a resource. Sometimes, economic rent maximization leads
to rapid development. Such is the case when resource prices are expected
5. See, e.g., STEPHEN McDONALD, THE LEASING OF FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FUELS PRO-
DUCTION, at ch. 3 (Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., 1979), or WALTER J. MEAD,
OFFSHORE LANDS: OIL AND GAS LEASING AND CONSERVATION ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF,
at ch. 2 (Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research, San Francisco 1985).
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to remain constant or to decline, or when necessary costs are expected
to increase. However, when resource prices are expected to rise rapidly
or when necessary costs are expected to decline, economic rent can be
increased by delaying development. Thus, diligent exploration and de-
velopment ought not to be defined as sooner rather than later development,
but instead as the set of lessee activities that maximizes the net present
value of a resource.
In the following sections we will address two aspects of federal natural
resource sale and leasing contracts that are intended to speed development.
They are rental payments and the primary lease term. Next, we will
analyze the effects of recent special policies designed to encourage the
early development of coal and geothermal leases. We will also look at
the unintended effect of the payment method on the timing of exploration
and development. Finally, we will examine the impact that federal reg-
ulations have on diligent exploration and development.
Lessee Diligence and Rental Payments
Lessees are required to make several different types of payments to
acquire the exclusive right to remove natural resources from federal lands.
The three most important types of outlays are bonus payments, royalty
payments and rental payments. A bonus payment is a one-time, nonre-
fundable cash outlay made at the time a lease is issued.6 Its size is usually
determined by competitive auction. Royalty payments are made once
production begins. They are defined as a percentage of the gross value
of the resource produced, and the percentage is frequently set by federal
law. Lessees are also required to make rental payments to the government
on an annual basis for all oil and gas, mineral and geothermal leases.
Rental payments begin when a lease is issued and (except for coal leases)
end when production begins and when the royalty payment exceeds the
rental payment obligation. These payments may be thought of as a penalty
paid by lessees for failure to develop a lease. Rental payments are gen-
erally based on the number of acres leased and vary depending on the
resource. Rental payments by resource are shown in Table 1.
The annual rental encourages early exploration and production from a
lease because rental payments can be avoided by beginning production.
They do not encourage resource conservation. Rental payments are viewed
as costs by lessees, although they are really transfer payments. Ideally,
transfer payments should not alter production timing. Such is not the case
with rental payments. From the perspective of resource conservation,
6. Cash bonus payments are occasionally made in installments.
Fall 1987)
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
TABLE I
Annual Rental Payments by Natural Resource
Resource
Asphalt (in Oklahoma)
Coal
Issued before 8/76
Issued after 8/76
Indian leases
Geothermal
Gilsonite
Hardrock Minerals*
Mineral Materials**
Oil and Natural Gas
Offshore
Onshore
Non-Competitive
Competitive
Indian Leases
National Petroleum
Reserve, Alaska
Phosphate (potash)
Potassium
Sodium
Sulphur
Timber
*Hardrock minerals include copper, lead, zinc, manganese, nickel, tungsten, gold, silver, bentonite,
barite, feldspar, fluorspar, and uranium.
**Mineral materials include common variety sand and gravel.
Source: Code of Federal Regulations
rental payments are unnecessary. To the extent that they alter timing
decisions, they are undesirable.
Supporters of rental payments argue that while federal lands remain
leased but unproductive, the government is entitled to compensation.
However, if leases are issued using competitive bidding, a rental payment
has the effect of reducing the present value of the lease to prospective
bidders who in turn will reduce the level of their bids. For this reason,
Annual Rental
$0.25/acre 1st year;
$0.50/acre 2nd through 5th years;
$1.00/acre each year thereafter
$1.00/acre credited against royalty payments
$3.00/acre not credited against royalty payments
$1.00/acre
Not less than $1.00/acre
$0.50/acre
$1.00/acre
None
Determined on a lease by lease basis (usually $3.00/acre)
$1.00/acre or $2.00/acre if known geological structure
$2.00/acre
$1.25/acre
Not less than $3.00/acre
Not less than $0.25/acre 1st year;
$0.50/acre 2nd and 3rd years;
$1 .00/acre each year thereafter
$0.25/acre 1st year;
$0.50/acre 2nd through 5th years;
$1.00/acre each year thereafter
$0.25/acre I st year;
$0.50/acre 2nd through 5th years;
$1.00/acre each year thereafter
$0.50/acre
None
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TABLE 2
Primary Lease Term by Natural Resource
Resource Primary Lease Term and Duration of Lease
Asphalt (in Oklahoma) Right to renewal after initial 20 year period and each 10 year period
thereafter
Coal 20 years and as long as producing
Indian leases 10 years and as long as producing
Geothermal 10 years and as long as producing but not more than 35 years
Gilsonite Each 20 year period subject to readjustment
Hardrock Minerals* Right to renewal after initial 20 year period and each 10 year period
thereafter
Mineral Materials**
Non-Competitive
Competitive
Oil and Natural Gas
Offshore
Onshore
Non-Competitive
Competitive
Indian Leases
National Petroleum
Reserve, Alaska
Phosphate
Potassium (potash)
Sodium
Sulphur
Timber
Not more than 5 years
Not more than 10 years
5 years (not to exceed 10 years) and as long as producing
10 years and as long as producing
5 years and as long as producing
10 years and as long as producing
10 years (or less)
Each 20 year period subject to readjustment
Each 20 year period subject to readjustment
Right to renewal after initial 20 year period and each 10 year period
thereafter
Right to renewal after initial 20 year period and each 10 year period
thereafter
Determined on a sale by sale basis (usually 3 to 7 years)
*Hardrock minerals include copper, lead, zinc, manganese, nickel, tungsten, gold, silver, bentonite,
barite, feldspar, fluorspar, and uranium.
**Mineral materials include common variety sand and gravel.
Source: Code of Federal Regulations
anticipated rental payments are not borne by the lessee, but are borne by
the lessor as lower bids.
Lessee Diligence and the Primary Lease Term
The primary lease term is the time period during which a lessee has
the exclusive right to develop the land. For oil and gas, coal, and geo-
thermal leases, if resources are discovered in commercial quantities, and
if production begins during this term, the lease is routinely extended until
production ends. For other resources the lease reverts to the government
at the end of the primary lease term. The primary lease term varies
depending on the resource as shown in Table 2.
Fall 1987]
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It is the clear intent of government to encourage early exploration and
development of leases through the imposition of a primary lease term.
However, to the extent that lessees alter exploration and production de-
cisions to conform with a primary lease term, economic rent is reduced.
For example, suppose that an unconstrained firm (with respect to pro-
duction timing) would develop a certain lease tract in twelve years and
formulates its bid on this basis. The twelve-year period is chosen by the
firm because it maximizes the present value of the resource. Next suppose
that the same firm is constrained by a five-year primary lease term. The
present value of the lease would be reduced. As a consequence, the firm
would reformulate its bid, adjusting it downward to take account of the
binding time constraint. This problem is heightened if large quantities of
land are leased over a short period of time. For example, under the
administration of Interior Secretary James Watt, Outer Continental Shelf
oil and gas leasing was accelerated. With a five-year primary lease term
in effect, this leasing sharply increased the demand for drilling rigs causing
exploration costs to rise. These anticipated higher costs were subtracted
from expected revenues leading to lower bids. Thus, the cost of encour-
aging early development is borne by the government itself. Further, re-
sources are misallocated to early production. While the former appears
to be merely a redistribution of income, both consequences are social
costs reflecting loss of resource value.
These arguments suggest that the primary lease term ought to be elim-
inated. The sale of mineral rights without a primary lease term is equiv-
alent to privatization because it shifts the timing of resource development
from the public sector to the private sector.
There are many reasons to believe that private sector management may
be preferable to public sector management. One reason is the incentives
facing private managers as opposed to public managers. With wealth
maximization as their motive, private managers have a strong incentive
to use their resources efficiently. Those managers who obtain the greatest
value from their resources and who time the use of their resources op-
timally are rewarded with maximum wealth. Private decisionmakers who
fail to use resources efficiently are held accountable for their actions by
a direct reduction in wealth. This is not the case for public sector managers
who are not likely to gain personally from efficient decision making or
to suffer from mismanagement.
Secondly, public sector decisions governing natural resource use are
likely to favor the present relative to the future. The reason for this
"shortsightedness" is that politicians must consider the value of their
actions in terms of being re-elected. As a consequence, politicians tend
to favor those programs which provide near-term visible benefits and
[Vol. 27
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whose costs are in the future and are dispersed throughout the economy.7
One explanation for the imposition of a primary lease term is the
impatience of politicians to derive political gain from the leasing program.
Once the decision has been made to issue natural resource leases, they
are eager to see immediate benefits.
Two often-voiced criticisms of privatization are: (1) by removing un-
developed resources from the control of government, the needs of future
generations will not be met; and (2) a primary lease term is necessary to
avoid "speculative hoarding" of leases by large firms. Ironically the first
criticism implies that too much of the resources will be developed today,
while the second implies exactly the opposite. Neither of these concerns
are economically justified.
Suppose, for example, that natural resources are being depleted too
rapidly, the evidence being that their in situ values are increasing faster
than the opportunity cost of money.' Under such conditions, it is in the
interest of wealth maximizing resource owners to save their reserves for
future generations by producing less today.
Although markets respond effectively to resource scarcity, it may not
be possible politically to eliminate the primary lease term. In our view,
any lengthening of the lease term would be desirable. Its total elimination
would be ideal. To the extent that the constraint cannot be significantly
relaxed, the government collects less of its potential economic rent, and
resources are allocated less efficiently between the present and future
generations.
Other Lease Requirements Designed to Encourage Diligence
Several special requirements have been adopted to encourage early
exploration and development of federal resources. One recent requirement
affects coal leases. On December 5, 1986, the Interior Department adopted
a new rule prohibiting lessees from obtaining new onshore mineral leases
if they have held a coal lease for ten years without production. 9 An Interior
Department official has indicated that as many as 140 leases may fail to
meet the new requirement. 0 In reaction to the new requirement, lessees
will either accelerate lease development, sell leases to other developers,
or surrender leases to the government. If the first option is selected,
7. For further discussion of the arguments favoring privatization see Richard L. Stroup, In Defense
ofAsset Management: the Privatization Component, 5 CONTEMPORARY POuCY ISSUES, at 14-21 (Mar,
1984).
8. In situ value is the value of a resource in the ground. It is the market price of a resource less
its marginal extraction cost.
9. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,910-43,925 (1986).
10. U.S. is Expected to Adopt Ruling Limiting Coal Leases, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 16.
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resource conservation is not served. If the second option is selected, the
lease may be acquired by a less efficient producer, and, again, resource
conservation is not attained. If lessees ignore the new requirement, al-
though they may be the most efficient producer for a yet to be issued
lease, they would be prohibited from bidding. This too would result in
an inefficient allocation of resources and a reduction in payments to the
government. "
To accelerate the exploration of geothermal leases, lessees are required
to make minimum exploration expenditures during the fifth through fif-
teenth years of the lease. 2 The minimum annual exploration expenditures
are shown in Table 3. All exploration expenditures made during the first
five years of a lease, and all exploration expenditures during later years
above the required minimum are carried forward to meet future minimum
expenditure requirements. 3 When actual exploration expenditures fall
short of the minimum requirements, lessees may opt to pay an additional
$3 per acre in rental payments instead of making the required exploration
expenditure. Failure to make required exploration expenditures or addi-
tional rental payments can result in the loss of the lease.'4
Although this requirement will have the desired effect of stimulating
exploration, it is not a wise policy. When a lessee acquires a lease, an
exploration plan is formulated. Exploration expenditures are incurred to
acquire information about a lease. In the absence of required expenditures,
TABLE 3
Diligent Exploration Expenditures
Lease Expenditure
Year Per Acre
6 4
7 6
8 8
9 10
to 12
11 12
12 12
13 12
14 12
15 12
Source: 43 CF.R. § 3203.5
I1. DAVID F. LINOWES, Report of the Commission on Fair Market Value for Federal Coal Leasing,
292-304 (Feb. 1984).
12. 43 C.F.R. §3203.5.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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additional exploration expenditures are made if the expected value of the
benefits of these expenditures exceeds their costs. As more information
is collected, the expected benefits of additional exploration are altered.
The acquisition of information may encourage or discourage exploration.
Required exploration expenditures distort exploration decisions by en-
couraging early and excessive exploration. As is the case with the primary
lease term, to the extent that required expenditures vary from those war-
ranted by present value maximization, the present value of a lease is
reduced and lessees will reduce the level of their bids accordingly. Re-
quired exploration expenditures should be eliminated."5
Lessee Diligence and Royalty Payments
Virtually all federal leases require royalty payments. Generally the
royalty rate is fixed at the time a lease is issued in accordance with federal
law. Royalty payments are calculated as a percentage of gross (not net)
product value. Required royalty rates are shown in Table 4. In some
TABLE 4
Royalty Rate by Natural Resource
Resource
Asphalt (in Oklahoma)
Coal
Geothermal
Gilsonite
Hardrock Minerals*
Mineral Materials**
Oil and Natural Gas
Offshore
Onshore
Non-Competitive
Competitive
Phosphate
Potassium
Sodium
Sulphur
Timber
Customary Royalty
Not less than $0.25/ton of marketable production
8 percent of value aboveground; 12.5% or value underground
10 to 15% of value of steam
Determined on a case by case basis
Determined on a case by case basis
None
Determined on a case by case basis (usually 162/3%)
12.5%
Determined on a case by case basis
Not less than 5% of gross value of output
Not less than 2% of gross value of output
Not less than 2% of gross value of output
5%
Determined on a case by case basis
*Hardrock minerals include copper, lead, zinc, manganese, nickel, tungsten, gold, silver, bentonite,
barite, feldspar, fluorspar, and uranium.
**Mineral materials include common variety sand and gravel.
Source: Code of Federal Regulations
15. For an extensive description and analysis of federal geothermal leasing procedures see Dennis
D. Muraoka and Walter J. Mead, An Economic Analysis of Federal Geothermal Leasing Procedures,
26 NAT. Res. J. 675 (1987).
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instances, the royalty rate has been used as the bid variable in lease
auctions. Such was the case for several offshore leases resulting in royalty
rates varying from fifty-two to eighty-two percent. Federal timber from
the national forests has traditionally been auctioned using a royalty-like
payment called a log scale payment. In these auctions the firms offer bids
as dollar payments per thousand board feet of each species to be removed
from the forest. Until recently, payment was made when the trees were
removed from the forest.
Royalty payments are inconsistent with the goal of early exploration
and development. As with rental payments, royalty payments are viewed
as costs by the lessees. However, unlike rental payments which can be
avoided by speeding production, royalty payments may be delayed, and
therefore partly avoided, by delaying production.
The problem of delayed production has been especially troublesome
with federal timber sales. In the 1970s, the price of timber rose steadily.
Anticipating further increases, timber companies made large bids in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. When timber prices collapsed in the early
1980s, many companies were left with federal contracts that could not
be completed at a profit. The problem was so widespread that eventually
the federal government took special measures to aid the forest products
industry. First, the government granted contract extensions. Later, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Timber Contract Modification Act of 1984
(FTCPMA) which enabled distressed firms to "buy-out" up to fifty-five
percent of their contracts for pennies on the dollar. 6 The FTCPMA also
altered the timing of contract payments. Rather than making payments
on a "pay-as-cut" basis, firms are now required to make periodic pay-
ments throughout the length of the contract regardless of whether the
timber has been harvested.
Thus, while the government has otherwise attempted to encourage early
production, its use of royalty payments has actually worked counter to
this objective. In addition, royalty payments are viewed by lessees as a
marginal cost on each unit of output. As such, they affect output decision
making, leading lessees to abandon production prematurely. In the case
of minerals, valuable reserves are left in the ground. In the case of timber,
logging companies have an incentive to either destroy or abandon logs
that have social values greater than social cost. For resource conservation
and optimal exploration and development, the optimal royalty rate is
zero. It is our recommendation that the government reduce royalty rates
as much as politically possible.
Lessee Diligence and Government Regulations
The number of required permits and the extent of government regu-
16. For details see, Dennis D. Muraoka and Richard B. Watson, Improving the Efficiency of
Federal Timber Sale Procedures: An Update, 26 NAT. REs. J. 69-76 (1986).
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lations have greatly increased since the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969.
A variety of federal, state and local permits are now required to explore
and develop a lease. Many of the permits and regulations are designed
to protect the environment. The rationale for the regulatory and permit
process is to avoid or internalize possible external costs that may result
from resource development. To the extent that the required permits and
regulations result in the internalization of external costs they are desirable.
However, required federal, state and local permits may seriously delay
the development of a lease, and delays are likely to become longer as
more controversial and environmentally sensitive areas are leased. The
permit process accords local jurisdictions and political lobbies the op-
portunity to impose delays, and has been used in this way. All government
permits and regulations should be submitted to the rigors of benefit-cost
analysis. Those permits and regulations which provide net benefits to
society should be retained. The remainder should be eliminated.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The federal government has wisely chosen not to develop the vast
quantities of natural resources found on public lands itself, but instead
has transferred these rights to the private sector. A longstanding objective
of the federal government has been to encourage operators of federal
leases to act diligently in the development of these resources. Several
different policies have been used to accomplish this objective.
Rental payments are required of all mineral and geothermal leases prior
to the commencement of production. With the exception of coal leases,
rental payments cease when they are exceeded by royalty payments.
Although rental payments encourage early production, they reduce the
present value of the economic rent that can be derived from federal lands.
Furthermore, the payment to the government on competitive leases is
reduced when rental payments are required. Rental payments are unnec-
essary from the perspective of resource conservation and ought to be
eliminated.
A feature of many federal natural resource lease contracts is a primary
lease term. The primary lease term is the length of time that a lessee is
granted the exclusive right to the natural resources found on a tract of
federal land. For most resources, federal leases are routinely extended
beyond the primary lease term for as long as resources are produced. The
primary lease term encourages early production, but like the rental pay-
ment, it reduces the economic rent that can be derived from the land and
reduces the payment to the government. Ideally, the primary lease term
ought to be eliminated.
In addition to rental payments and a primary lease term, special pro-
grams have been developed for specific resources. Special diligence re-
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quirements are currently in effect for coal and geothermal leases. While
these requirements will encourage early development, they do not en-
courage resource conservation and should be abandoned.
Royalty payments, required permits and regulations have the unin-
tended effect of delaying production. Royalty payments are viewed by
lessees as marginal costs that can be avoided by delaying production. For
this and other reasons, royalty payments are to be avoided. The permit
and regulatory process is designed primarily to internalize externalities.
Unfortunately, this process can also be used by special interest groups to
delay development. Those permits and regulations that do not result in
net benefits to society ought to be eliminated.
